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NECESSITY IS THE MOTHER OF INNOVATION
DURING THE CREDIT CRISIS
DAVID LINE BATTY*
I. INTRODUCTION
The credit crisis, which began during summer 2007, took a
seemingly impossible turn for the worse during September 2008.
In rapid succession, Lehman Brothers collapsed into bankruptcy,
AIG became a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Federal Reserve,
and Wachovia was forced to merge with Wells Fargo to avoid a
fate similar to Lehman Brothers. These events, together with a
deepening global recession, paralyzed the syndicated loan market
for new debt issuances and threw the secondary market for
existing syndicated loans into free fall. This severe market
dislocation tested several presumptions in syndicated loan credit
agreements and forced both borrowers and lenders to structure
novel solutions to problems that were virtually inconceivable when
the applicable contract terms were drafted. For example, because
various Lehman Brothers' entities and affiliates were lenders in
numerous syndicated loan agreements at the time of the Lehman
Brothers' bankruptcy, that bankruptcy triggered "defaulting
lender" provisions' in a significant percentage of outstanding
syndicated loan agreements. Prior to fall 2008 defaulting lender
provisions were rarely applied. Similarly, the widespread lack of
liquidity that characterized this period caused previously
predictable pricing mechanisms to yield unpredictable results.
Furthermore, the collapse of the secondary market for syndicated
loans led numerous borrowers to attempt repurchasing their own
* Mr. Batty is a Partner at Winston & Strawn LLP in Charlotte, North Carolina.
1. In a syndicated credit agreement, a lender that fails to fulfill its contractual
obligation to make loans is a "defaulting lender." Defaulting lender provisions are
the express contractual remedies available to the other parties to a syndicated loan
agreement for dealing with a defaulting lender. Defaulting lender provisions do not
supersede other claims for damages that are available under general contract law for
breach of contract.
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debt at a discount from lenders needing liquidity. Finally, as many
lenders were unable or unwilling to make new loans for most of
2009, borrowers facing impending maturities sought to extend
existing deals with their current lenders. Although some lenders
were willing to agree to such extensions, other lenders were not
and maintained their loans' existing maturity date.
Part II of this Article is a general overview of basic
syndicated lending concepts for those unfamiliar with the
syndicated loan market! Part III analyzes the shortcomings of
previously common defaulting lender protections in an illiquid
loan market.3  Part IV discusses efforts to cope with an
unprecedented inversion of the historic relationship between the
London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and the prime rate
allowing savvy borrowers to borrow at rates below some Lenders'
cost of funds.4 Part V addresses the evolution of the loan market's
response to below par debt buy-back transactions.5 Finally, Part
VI of this article provides an overview of the use of "amend and
extend" transactions to manage the illiquidity that characterized
the syndicated loan market for most of 2009.6
II. OVERVIEW OF SYNDICATED LENDING CONCEPTS
Syndicated loans are large commercial loans provided to
corporate borrowers by a group, or syndicate, of lenders. The
syndicate of lenders, or bank group, is arranged by one of the
lenders in the syndicate. The arranger of the syndicated loan
typically holds a larger percentage of the overall loan than any of
the other individual lenders and acts as the administrative agent
for the bank group with respect to the syndicated loan. Despite
the use of the term "agent," the administrative agent does not act
as a fiduciary agent for the other lenders. Rather, the
administrative agent's role is to facilitate the operation of the loan
transaction by acting as the primary administrative point of contact
2. See infra Part II, pp. 2-4.
3. See infra Part III, pp. 4-12.
4. See infra Part IV, pp. 12-13.
5. See infra Part V, pp. 14-24.
6. See infra Part VI, pp. 24-27.
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for both the borrower and the lenders with respect to the
syndicated credit agreement. The borrower makes all payments to
the administrative agent who then distributes to each lender its
ratable share of such payment based on such lender's participation
percentage in the syndicated loan. Similarly, the borrower delivers
borrowing requests only to the administrative agent. The
administrative agent is responsible for notifying each of the
lenders of the borrowing request. In response, each lender then
funds its share of the requested loan to the administrative agent.
Once the lenders have funded their loans, the administrative agent
makes the full amount of the requested loan available to the
borrower. Syndicated loans are popular among both borrowers
and lenders for a number of reasons. First, syndicated loans allow
borrowers to obtain loans larger than those available from a single
lender. Also, borrowers prefer the ease of dealing with a single
administrative agent, rather than a number of individual lenders
through separate loan agreements. Lenders benefit by spreading
loan commitments and obligations among multiple syndicated
loans to different borrowers. This allows lenders to manage
default risks by diversifying their loan portfolios.
In addition to standard loan arrangements such as
revolving credit lines and term loans, syndicated loans frequently
include other credit products, such as letters of credit and swing
line loans. A letter of credit is document issued by a bank or other
financial institution to a named beneficiary at the request of the
borrower to guarantee a payment obligation of the borrower.
Letters of credit are frequently used to facilitate foreign trade or to
act as security for material future payment obligations such as a
multi-year lease. The named beneficiary of the letter of credit is
guaranteed payment by the issuing bank in the event that the
borrower defaults on the underlying payment obligation secured
by the letter of credit. Because the purpose of a letter of credit is
to assure prompt payment to the beneficiary, it is not practical for
a syndicate of lenders to jointly issue letters of credit. Instead, one
7. See generally STANDARD & POOR'S, A GUIDE TO THE LOAN MARKET (Sept.
2009), available at https://www.lcdcomps.com/d/pdf/LoanMarketguide.pdf (providing
a detailed discussion of syndicated loans).
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lender, typically the administrative agent, will provide a single
letter of credit for the full amount requested by the borrower.
Once the letter of credit is funded, the borrower is required to
repay promptly the issuing lender for the full amount funded by
the issuing lender on account of the letter of credit. If the
borrower does not repay the issuing lender, each of the other
lenders party to the syndicated credit agreement have an
obligation to reimburse the issuing lender for that amount. That
reimbursement amount takes the form of a mandatory syndicated
loan under the syndicated loan agreement with the proceeds
applied to repay the issuing lender for the amount funded under its
letter of credit.
A swing line loan is a short-term loan made directly by one
lender, typically the administrative agent, to the borrower on
shorter notice than is required for a syndicated loan from all of the
lenders. Swing line loans are also available in smaller amounts
than syndicated loans. If the borrower does not repay the swing
line loan within the required time frame, the swing line loan will
automatically convert into a syndicated loan. As is the case with
letters of credit, the other lenders will simply reimburse the swing
line lender for their respective ratable shares of the outstanding
swing line loan. Credit products such as letters of credit and swing
line loans are referred to as "fronting facilities" because one
lender advances, or "fronts," the full amount of the requested loan
and is later reimbursed by the other lenders party to the
syndicated credit agreement.
III. DEFAULTING LENDER ISSUES
The credit crisis had a material and adverse impact on the
financial health of many financial institutions. As their financial
strength eroded, weakened financial institutions sought to
conserve capital and made increasingly fewer loans. This lack of
liquidity caused the credit crisis and the recession the credit crisis
had triggered to worsen and weak financial institutions came
under even greater stress. This increased stress led to a higher risk
of outright collapse and risk that a distressed lender would be
unable to meet its obligation to fund loans under the syndicated
[Vol. 14
2010] SYNDICATED LOAN MARKET POST-COLLAPSE 5
loan agreements to which it was a party. In response, the
syndicated loan market began to focus more and more on the
effectiveness of defaulting lender provisions in syndicated loan
agreements. In particular, the typical remedy of the borrower
choosing to replace a defaulting lender at par is ineffective because
of the lack of liquidity which characterizes the current syndicate
loan market.8
Most current syndicated credit agreements include
provisions to address a lender's failure to fund its pro rata share of
an advance, reimbursement or participation under a syndicated
credit agreement. For example, the Model Credit Agreement
Provisions (Model Provisions) for syndicated credit agreements
published by the Loan Syndications and Trading Association
(LSTA) expressly give a borrower the right to require any
defaulting lender "to assign and delegate, without recourse, in
accordance with and subject to the [applicable assignment terms
and conditions], all of its interests, rights and obligations under this
Agreement and the related Loan Documents... to an assignee" at
par.9 Notably, the Model Provisions do not formally define
"defaulting lender." Furthermore, except as described above, the
Model Provisions do not address defaulting lender issues. Unlike
the Model Provisions, most syndicated credit agreements formally
define "defaulting lender." Such definitions frequently include
any lender deemed insolvent or who is in receivership. As
evidenced by the Model Provisions, defaulting lender terms were
typically drafted under the assumption that lenders would rarely
qualify as a defaulting lender, and in such cases a defaulting lender
could be readily replaced by an assignment at par.
The differences between the obligations of a defaulting
lender with an outstanding revolving credit commitment or other
unfunded commitment, such as a delayed draw term loan
commitment, and a defaulting lender holding a fully funded term
loan has revealed other weaknesses with typical defaulting lender
provisions. As discussed in more detail below, a defaulting lender
8. This problem was particularly acute during much of 2008 and 2009 when the
trading levels of most syndicated loans in the secondary market was well below par.
9. See MODEL CREDIT AGREEMENT PROVISIONS: YIELD PROTECrION § 3(b)
(2005).
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with an unfunded commitment presents credit risks to the
borrower, the administrative agent, and the other lenders. A
defaulting lender holding a fully funded term loan, however,
presents no credit risk to the borrower. With respect to the
administrative agent and lenders, the only credit risk presented by
a defaulting lender that has fully funded its term loan obligations
relate to the indemnification obligations of the lenders benefiting
the Administrative Agent (which typically only arise if the
borrower has breached its indemnification obligations) and
obligations to share amounts recovered by such defaulting lender
on account of the exercise of set-off rights or otherwise in excess of
its pro rata share of such recoveries.' °
A. Credit Risks Resulting From a Defaulting Lender
Defaulting lenders' unfunded revolving credit
commitments directly and adversely affect the borrower's liquidity
because the borrower is not able to borrow those funds from the
defaulting lender. To manage this liquidity problem a borrower
may increase borrowing requests by the amount necessary to cover
any expected shortfall attributable to a defaulting lender. This
approach's success is limited by the overall size of the revolving
credit commitment. Once the performing lenders have fully
funded their respective commitments, the borrower will be unable
to replace the defaulting lender's missing funds by increasing the
amount of loans from the performing lenders.
Although the lenders' obligations under a syndicated credit
agreement are several and not joint, the existence of a defaulting
lender nevertheless creates credit risk for the other members of
the bank group. For example, to the extent that a borrower
increases its borrowing requests as described above, the amount of
outstanding loans from the performing lenders will be higher than
would have been the case if there had not been a defaulting lender.
According to the Model Provisions, the administrative agent under
a syndicated credit agreement has the right, but not the obligation,
10. For a more complete discussion of the obligation of lenders to share
payments, see infra Part (V)(A).
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to pre-fund all or any portion of loans requested by the borrower
on behalf of the other lenders.1" In the current market, most
administrative agents have ceased all pre-funding loans on behalf
of the other lenders as a matter of policy. This eliminates credit
risk to the administrative agent associated with pre-funding the
portion of a loan that should have been funded by a defaulting
lender. To the extent the lender responsible for issuing letters of
credit is not fully repaid by the borrower for letter of credit
drawings, such issuing lender has credit exposure to the other
lenders that are obligated to reimburse the issuing lender for such
funded letter of credit with the proceeds of a syndicated loan. The
issuing lender cannot, however, rely on a defaulting lender to fund
its portion of the reimbursement. Although this credit risk was not
treated consistently in the credit agreements signed prior to the
Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy, issuing lenders typically have the
discretion to refuse to issue a letter of credit if one of the lenders
party to the syndicated loan agreement is a defaulting lender. This
discretion does not protect issuing lenders form the credit risk
associated with letters of credit outstanding at the time a lender
becomes a defaulting lender.
B. Remedial Provisions to Address Defaulting Lenders
Although a borrower has the right to replace a defaulting
lender, the ongoing lack of liquidity in the syndicated loan market
makes it virtually impossible to locate a replacement lender willing
to pay anything close to par to purchase a loan and commitment
from a defaulting lender. Further, to replace a defaulting lender,
the borrower must typically replace all of a defaulting lender's
obligations (revolving credit commitments and funded term loans).
Therefore, the borrower must obtain new loan commitments for
all of the defaulting lender's obligations (revolving credit
commitments and funded term loans) even if the borrower only
wants to replace the defaulting lender's revolving credit
commitment and leave the funded term loan obligations of the
11. See MODEL CREDIT AGREEMENT PROVISIONS: ADMIN. AGENT'S CLAWBACK
§ a (2005).
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defaulting lender outstanding. In addition to the borrower's
replacement right, a defaulting lender will lose certain economic
rights, such as the right to receive payment of commitment fees on
unfunded commitments. Finally, a defaulting lender is typically
stripped of virtually all voting rights. This is usually accomplished
either by excluding defaulting lenders from the calculation of
"required lenders" or by eliminating of a defaulting lender's voting
rights, except with respect to increases in the amount of or
extensions of the term of such lender's commitment. With the
exception of certain critical amendments (such as changes to
scheduled payment dates, reduction in the outstanding amount of
loans and reductions to fees and interest, and increases in loan
commitment for example) that need to be approved by all affected
lenders, most amendments to syndicated loan agreements need to
be approved only by lenders holding a minimum percentage of
outstanding credit obligations (loans and unfunded commitments).
This minimum percentage may be as low as a simple majority or as
high as 66%% or more. This Article refers to the requisite
percentage of lenders needed to approve an amendment (other
than the critical issues described in the preceding sentence) as
"required lenders."
C. Defaulting Administrative Agent
When the defaulting lender is the administrative agent,
additional issues arise including:
* Funding issues-Are loans funded by the
lenders but held by the administrative agent
prior to disbursement to the borrower the
bankrupt debtor's property (i.e., the
administrative agent's)?
* Payment issues-Do loan payments from the
borrower, held by the administrative agent
prior to distribution to the lenders, constitute
property of the bankrupt debtor's (i.e., the
administrative agent's) estate?
[Vol. 14
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Ongoing loan administration issues-Will
the administrative agent be able to carry out
its administrative obligations under the
credit agreement (including consenting to
assignments by other lenders) without the
bankruptcy court's approval?
These issues are especially important to consider if the
default lender has filed for bankruptcy. In the bankruptcy case of
12In re Lehman Commercial Paper Inc., some of these issues were
addressed. The bankruptcy court found "that the funds in the
Agency Account are not property of the Debtor's estate, except to
the extent of the Debtor's proportional share of such funds as
lender."' 3
The uncertainty of having a defaulting lender who is an
administrative agent creates significant pressure to replace such an
administrative agent. The Model Provisions permit an
administrative agent to resign for any reason upon notice to the
borrower and required lenders. 4 In the case of In re Lehman
Commercial Paper Inc., the bankruptcy court authorized Lehman
Commercial Paper to exercise its business judgment to determine
which agency relationships, if any, to terminate.15 The Model
Provisions do not provide for a forced removal of the
administrative agent by the borrower or the required lenders.
While such a right could be added to a credit agreement by
amendment, the automatic stay may prevent such an amendment
if the administrative agent is in bankruptcy.
D. Assignments and Participations
A loan participation is where a third party, or participant,
purchases an interest in the selling lender's share of a syndicated
12. In re Lehman Commercial Paper Inc., No. 08-13900 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 6, 2008) [hereinafter October 6"h Order].
13. Id. (order authorizing debtor to continue to utilize its agency bank account,
terminate agency relationships, and elevate loan participation).
14. See MODEL CREDIT AGREEMENT PROVISIONS: AGENCY §6 (2005)
15. October 6' Order, supra note 12.
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loan. The participation interest is evidenced by a separate
contract, or participation agreement, between the participant and
the selling lender. The participant does not become a party to the
underlying loan agreement and the selling lender continues to be
the full owner of the applicable loan for all purposes under the
syndicated loan agreement. A participation is different from an
assignment where the assignee becomes a party to the applicable
loan agreement and has direct contractual privity with the other
parties to the loan agreement. Because a participant is only
entitled to receive payments from the selling lender under the
participation agreement, the participant has no direct claim against
the borrower for payments. A defaulting lender may have sold
participations to third parties pursuant to the terms of the credit
agreement. Any such participations should be identified as
quickly as possible to determine how best to handle them going
forward. In the case of In re Lehman Commercial Paper Inc., the
bankruptcy court forced the conversion of all outstanding
participations to assignments.16 Whether such conversions should
be executed, however, should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
A defaulting lender also may be party to pending assignment
transactions, or loan trades, that have not yet closed and required
payment by the assignee to the assignor. To resolve open loan
trades pending at the time of the Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy,
the bankruptcy court heard arguments from both Lehman and the
assignment counterparties before determining which assignments
would be rejected, which trades would be completed, and which
trades would be closed on amended terms.
E. Bankruptcy Issues
If a defaulting lender has filed for bankruptcy, it will
benefit from the automatic stay under the Bankruptcy Code.
Some remedies may be prohibited by the automatic stay even if
those remedies were included in the original credit agreement.
Although there are no "bright line" tests for determining if actions
taken against a defaulting lender violate the automatic stay, any
16. Id.
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action or amendment which has a negative impact on the
economic right of the defaulting lender may invoke the stay.
Therefore, bankruptcy counsel should be consulted prior to taking
any actions against, or proposing any amendments that could
affect the defaulting lender's existing contract rights.
F. Response to Shortcomings in Defaulting Lender Provisions
In response to the inadequacy of the typical remedy of
simply replacing a defaulting lender revealed by the lack of
liquidity in the secondary syndicated loan market, various
administrative agents have developed additional remedial
provisions to address defaulting lender situations. First, standard
credit documentation has been clarified to strip defaulting lenders
of the right to receive any payment with respect to unfunded
commitments. Quite simply, if a defaulting lender is unable or
unwilling to honor its commitment to fund future advances, it will
not be paid for the commitment. Second, most current credit
agreements effectively subordinate the defaulting lender's right to
receive payments to the other lenders' rights to receive such
payments. This is accomplished by allocating principal and
interest payments to the obligations owed to non-defaulting
lenders prior to the defaulting lenders. Finally, the standard terms
for fronted facilities such as letter of credit and swing line
facilities17 now require full cash collateral from the borrower for all
fronted amounts whenever there is a defaulting lender.
Furthermore, fronted facilities are now only offered at the
discretion of the fronting lender even if there are no defaulting
lenders in the syndicate.
In addition to the changes to standard credit
documentation described above, other remedial provisions have
been incorporated into recent deals. For example, certain
transactions give the borrower the right to unilaterally terminate
the commitment of a defaulting lender without other lenders'
consent. Similarly, in certain circumstances the lenders
17. See supra Part II (providing an overview of letter of credit and swing line
facilities).
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constituting the required lenders have demanded the right to force
a defaulting administrative agent to resign, however, the right to
force the resignation of an administrative agent is rarely granted.
Such rights are also typically limited to asset-based lending
transactions where the administrative agent has numerous
obligations with respect to day-to-day management of the loans
and collateral.
IV. PRICING ISSUES IN THE SYNDICATED LOAN MARKET
Syndicated loan agreements typically provide the borrower
with two interest rate options-a base rate of interest (the Base
Rate) which is linked to the administrative agent's prime rate or an
interest rate linked to LIBOR, the rate at which banks are willing
to lend to each other in the London Interbank market. In either
case, a pricing margin is added to the underlying reference rate.
This pricing margin preserves the lender's return once the cost of
funds is deducted from the overall interest rate. Historically, the
prime rate has been higher than LIBOR. Because of the stable
relationship between prime rate and LIBOR, the pricing margin
for Base Rate loans in most syndicated credit agreements has
generally been between one percent and 1.50% (this difference is
the LIBOR-Base Rate Spread) less than the applicable margin for
LIBOR Loans. The LIBOR-Base Rate Spread was used to
achieve relative pricing parity between Base Rate loans and
LIBOR loans so that the Borrower had no meaningful incentive to
select one rate of interest over the other. One of the effects of the
financial crisis was an inversion of the historic relationship
between the prime rate and LIBOR during fall 2008.18 Although
temporary, this rate inversion meant that in many instances the
interest rate paid by a borrower for a Base Rate loan was lower
than the interest rate paid by the borrower for a LIBOR Loans.
18. See generally Malcolm G. Henderson, Turmoil in Credit Markets Causes
Inversion of Key Bank Lending Rates, FOLEY HOAG, LLP, Oct. 14, 2008,
http://www.foleyhoag.com/newscenter/publications/alerts/business/business-alert-
101408.aspx?ref=l (describing the inversion of the prime rate and LIBOR during fall
2008).
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This subjected banks to unexpected and unacceptable negative
returns once the cost of funds was taken into account.
To resolve the problems caused by potential future rate
inversions, administrative agents have revised the standard Base
Rate definition. Historically, the Base Rate was defined as equal
to the greater of (1) the administrative agent's publicly announced
prime rate and (2) the sum of 0.50%19 plus the federal funds rate.2
Following the period of rate inversion during fall 2008, the Base
Rate definition has been revised to include a third prong so that
the Base Rate is equal to the greatest of (1) the administrative
agent's publicly announced prime rate, (2) the sum of 0.50% plus
the federal funds rate, and (3) a rate equal to the sum of (a)
LIBOR for an interest period of one month plus (b) the LIBOR-
Base Rate Spread. The addition of the LIBOR-based third prong
to the Base Rate definition ensures that regardless of the actual
relationship of the prime rate to LIBOR, the interest rate for Base
Rate loans cannot drop below the interest rate for LIBOR-based
loans.
19. Although a fifty (50) basis point spread is typical for Base Rate determined
by reference to the federal funds, this spread is subject to negotiation and may be as
high as one hundred and fifty (150) basis points.
20. The federal funds rate is a daily rate per annum equal to the weighted
average of the rates on overnight Federal funds transactions with members of the
Federal Reserve System arranged by federal funds brokers on such day (or, if such
day is not a business day, for the immediately preceding business day), as published
by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York on the business day next succeeding such
day, provided that if such rate is not so published for any day which is a business day,
the average of the quotation for such day on such transactions received by the
administrative agent from three Federal Funds brokers of recognized standing
selected by the administrative agent. Similar to LIBOR, the federal funds rate is
measurement of the cost of funds to a bank for short term borrowings.
21. This solution to the rate inversion issue creates several new complications
when calculating the interest rate for Base Rate loans. For example, because LIBOR
is now an element in calculating the Base Rate, the standard LIBOR illegality and
unavailability provisions set forth in the Model Provisions must be modified to
address situations when LIBOR would otherwise be used to calculate the interest
rate applicable for Base Rate loans.
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V. DEBT BuY-BACKS OF TERM LOANS
Historically, senior secured loans have been a stable asset
class, with prices of term loans22 in the secondary market trading
within a narrow band near par.23 Despite this historic stability, the
unprecedented disruption of the credit markets caused significant
negative effects for the senior secured loan market. Secondary
market prices decreased to a discount from par of twenty to thirty
percent, or more during 2008.24 Such depressed conditions
continued well into 2009. Borrowers and their affiliates viewed the
crisis as an opportunity to repurchase debt at a significant
discount. Because the purchase price will be less than par,
however, not all lenders may be willing to sell their loans at the
price offered.
The most common form of debt buy-back is a repurchase
by the borrower or a subsidiary that is followed by an immediate
cancellation of the debt. Because a repurchase with an immediate
cancellation is effectively the same as an optional prepayment,
some debt buybacks were structured as optional repayments.
Debt buy-backs may also take the form of a purchase or
assignment of debt by a parent holding company or a non-
subsidiary affiliate with debt either cancelled as a condition to the
buy-back or with the debt remaining outstanding subject to
subordination protections in favor of the non-affiliated lenders.
As discussed more fully below in Part V, assignments to the
borrower or optional repayments by the borrower tend to give rise
to more problematic voting issues than assignments to a parent
holding company or a non-subsidiary affiliate.
22. Because revolving loans can be repaid and re-borrowed, they do not generate
a predictable future stream of interest income. For this reason, and because
revolving loans include a future commitment to lend, most loan investment funds are
prohibited by their organizational documents from purchasing or holding revolving
credit loans. Therefore, the secondary loan trading market is limited to term loan
obligations.
23. See MEREDITH COFFEY, LSTA, STATE OF THE U.S. LEVERAGED LOAN
MARKET 3 (2009).
24. See id.
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A. Are Debt Buy-Backs Permitted under Syndicated Loan
Agreements?
Due in part to the historic price stability of the senior
secured loan asset class, most syndicated loan agreements closed
before the credit crisis began simply did not contemplate non-par
debt buy-backs. Syndicated loan agreements that do not directly
deal with non-par debt buy-backs must be reviewed carefully to
determine which terms and conditions may be implicated by a
proposed non-par debt buy-back. The key issue raised by a debt
buy-back transaction is whether or not the transaction may
properly be characterized as a payment by or on behalf of a
borrower to the lenders participating in the buy-back transaction.
Each lender participates equally and expects equal repayment.
Therefore, one of syndicated loan transactions' central terms is
that all lenders that must be party to a syndicated loan transaction
are treated equally and ratably on a pari passu basis with the other
similarly situated lenders party to such syndicated loan transaction.
However, not every lender may be willing to take a below par
repayment in connection with a debt buyback transaction.
Therefore, a debt buyback will result in not every lender receiving
a payment in exchange for selling their loans. To the extent that
this payment is properly characterized as a repayment of
outstanding loans, the requirement that payment must be made to
all lenders on an equal and ratable basis will be violated.
1. Credit Agreement Provisions Applicable to Debt Buy-Back
Transactions
Typically, the following credit agreement provisions restrict
debt buy-back transactions and will need to be amended or
modified to permit a debt buy-back transaction:
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
" Assignment provisions including the
definition of "Eligible Assignee "'  and
limitations on assignments to affiliates of the
Borrower;
26
* Payment sharing provisions requiring that
payments of loans received by a Lender in
excess of its pro rata share thereof shall be
shared ratably with the other Lenders;27 and
25. See MODEL CREDIT AGREEMENT PROVISIONS: DEFINITIONS (2005):
"Eligible Assignee" means (a) a Lender, (b) an Affiliate of a Lender, (c) an
Approved Fund, and (d) any other Person (other than a natural
person) approved by (i) the Administrative Agent, (ii) in the case of
any assignment of a [Revolving] Commitment, the Issuing Bank, and
(iii) unless an [Institution to select appropriate cross-reference to
default] has occurred and is continuing, the Borrower (each such
approval not to be unreasonably withheld or delayed); provided that
notwithstanding the foregoing, "Eligible Assignee" shall not include
the Borrower or any of the Borrower's Affiliates or Subsidiaries.
26. See MODEL CREDIT AGREEMENT PROVISIONS, supra note 25, SUCCESSORS
AND ASSIGNS:
(b) Assignments by Lenders. Any Lender may at any time assign to one or
more assignees all or a portion of its rights and obligations under this
Agreement (including all or a portion of its Commitment and the
Loans at the time owing to it); provided that any such assignment shall
be subject to the following conditions:
(v) No Assignment to Borrower. No such assignment shall be made to the
Borrower or any of the Borrower's Affiliates or Subsidiaries.
(d) Participations. Any Lender may at any time, without the consent of, or
notice to, the Borrower or the Administrative Agent, sell participations
to any Person (other than a natural person or the Borrower or any of
the Borrower's Affiliates or Subsidiaries)...
27. See MODEL CREDIT AGREEMENT PROVISIONS, supra note 25, SHARING OF
PAYMENTS BY LENDER:
If any Lender shall, by exercising any right of setoff or counterclaim or
otherwise, obtain payment in respect of any principal of or interest on
any of its Loans or other obligations hereunder resulting in such
Lender's receiving payment of a proportion of the aggregate amount of
its Loans and accrued interest thereon or other such obligations greater
than its pro rata share thereof as provided herein, then the Lender
receiving such greater proportion shall (a) notify the Administrative
Agent of such fact, and (b) purchase (for cash at face value)
[Vol. 14
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0 Payment provisions requiring that all
payments of loans by the Borrower shall be
made to the Lenders on a pro rata basis.28
participations in the Loans and such other obligations of the other
Lenders, or make such other adjustments as shall be equitable, so that
the benefit of all such payments shall be shared by the Lenders ratably
in accordance with the aggregate amount of principal of and accrued
interest on their respective Loans and other amounts owing them,
provided that:
(i) if any such participations are purchased and all or any portion of the
payment giving rise thereto is recovered, such participations shall be
rescinded and the purchase price restored to the extent of such
recovery, without interest; and
(ii) the provisions of this paragraph shall not be construed to apply to
(x) any payment made by the Borrower pursuant to and in accordance
with the express terms of this Agreement or (y) any payment obtained
by a Lender as consideration for the assignment of or sale of a
participation in any of its Loans or participations in LC Disbursements
to any assignee or participant, other than to the Borrower or any
Subsidiary thereof (as to which the provisions of this paragraph shall
apply).
[The Borrower] [Each Loan Party] consents to the foregoing and agrees, to the
extent it may effectively do so under applicable law, that any Lender
acquiring a participation pursuant to the foregoing arrangements may
exercise against [the Borrower] [each Loan Party] rights of setoff and
counterclaim with respect to such participation as fully as if such
Lender were a direct creditor of [the Borrower] [each Loan Party] in
the amount of such participation.
28. Although the Model Provisions do not include an express requirement that
all payments of loans by the Borrower shall be made to the Lenders on a pro rata
basis, many credit agreements do include such a requirement. An example of such
language from form documents used by my law firm is:
Each payment by the Borrower on account of the principal of or interest on the
Loans or of any fee, commission or other amounts (including the
Reimbursement Obligation) payable to the Lenders under this
Agreement shall be made not later than 1:00 p.m. on the date specified
for payment under this Agreement to the Administrative Agent at the
Administrative Agent's Office for the account of the Lenders (other
than as set forth below) pro rata in accordance with their respective
Commitment Percentages (except as specified below), in Dollars, in
immediately available funds and shall be made without any set off,
counterclaim or deduction whatsoever.
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2. Amendments and Voting Issues
As discussed in above, most syndicated loan agreements in
place at the outset of the credit crisis did not contemplate non-par
debt buy-backs. Therefore, any proposed debt buy-back will
generally require the amendment of most or all of the Model
Provisions identified above. Unfortunately, because the Model
Provisions do not address voting, there is not one consistent
standard of approval necessary to amend the credit agreement
provisions implicated by a debt buy-back transaction. In some
transactions, the relevant provisions could be amended with the
consent of the required lenders. Other transactions required the
consent of all lenders to amend the same provisions. This
inconsistency led to market confusion and borrower frustration as
market participants struggled to understand why a debt buy-back
needed a simple amendment approved by the required lenders in
certain deals, but all of the lenders' consent to the proposed debt
buy-back in other deals. Despite the Model Provisions' lack of
uniform voting mechanics, most credit agreements permit
modifications to the assignment provisions (including the
definition of "Eligible Assignee" and limitations on assignments to
affiliates of the borrower) to be approved by the required lenders.
Similarly, most credit agreements require the approval of all of the
lenders to modify credit agreement provisions relating both to the
(a) requirement that payments or prepayments of loans by the
borrower shall be made to the lenders on a pro rata basis and (b)
the sharing of payments by lenders.2 9
Even during the loan "bull" market preceding the credit
crisis, amendments requiring one-hundred percent lender approval
were difficult and costly to obtain. This is because many loan
investment funds had few employees and lacked the basic
administrative structure necessary to evaluate and respond to
29. Some credit agreements only require one-hundred percent approval for
changes to the requirement that payments of loans by the borrower shall be made to
the lenders on a pro rata basis but not the sharing of payments by lenders Section.
Conversely, other Credit Agreements take the opposite approach. Due to the
interplay of these Sections, however, there is likely not a practical difference in the
outcome of the two approaches.
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amendment requests. Such funds would thus not even consider an
amendment unless it carried a significant fee. Following the start
of the credit crisis, amendments requiring one-hundred percent
approval became virtually impossible to complete at any cost
because many lenders sought to use their "veto" power to
negotiate for a repayment or buy-out at par. Due to the near
certainly that such amendments will be rejected, most syndicated
loan arrangers are unwilling to even propose amendments
requiring one-hundred percent lender approval. Although
amendments needing only the consent of the required lenders are
not guaranteed approval, many can be successfully passed by
including "sweeteners" to gain lender support for the proposed
debt buy-back amendment such as:
* Amendment fees;
" Pricing increases;
" Prohibition of funding the debt buy-back
with proceeds of revolving credit loans
* Detailed and even-handed auction pro-
cedures to ensure that each lender has an
equal opportunity to participate in the debt
buy-back, most often on a pro rata basis at
the market clearing price level; and
" Limitations on the overall size and
timeframe of the buy-back.
Although it took some time to develop a consensus, most
syndicated loan market participants now agree that pro rata
making and sharing of payment provisions do not apply to an
assignment made to the parent holding company of a borrower
(especially if the loans which are assigned to the parent holding
company remain outstanding or if the debt buy-back is funded
with the proceeds of a new equity contribution to the parent
holding company). This is because such a structure does not
require the borrower or any of its subsidiaries to take an
assignment of loans from a lender nor make any payment directly
to any lender as a result of the debt buy-back. As noted above, the
Sharing of Payments by Lender of Model Provisions do not
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require the sharing of any payment made to a lender in connection
with an assignment of loans unless such assignment is made "to the
Borrower or any Subsidiary thereof.,
30
B. Other Issues to Consider
Often, debt purchased by a parent holding company or a
non-subsidiary affiliate was permitted to remain outstanding. 31 If
the repurchased debt remains outstanding, the amendment to
approve the proposed debt buy-back transaction will need to
include certain additional protections for the lenders. More
specifically, the repurchased debt holder's rights to participate in
bank group calls and meetings and to receive information will
need to be significantly restricted or eliminated in order to prevent
an affiliate of the borrower from accessing confidential bank group
information. Similarly, the repurchased debt holder's voting rights
will need to be significantly restricted or eliminated; otherwise, an
affiliate of the borrower will have the ability to influence the vote
on future amendments to the credit agreement.
An example illustrates the concern with allowing the
borrower's affiliates to vote on amendments.
30. See MODEL CREDIT AGREEMENT PROVISIONS, supra note 25 (defining sharing
payments by lenders).
31. The most common reason for leaving the repurchased debt outstanding was
to avoid the negative tax consequences of debt cancellation. More specifically, upon
cancellation of outstanding debt, the borrower will recognize ordinary income in an
amount equal to the discount on the face amount of the debt. Although this adverse
tax treatment was mitigated by the inclusion of a short term modification to the tax
code in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, some concerns remain. See
generally David L. Batty & Dennis Kelly, How the Tax Code Complicates Amending
Financing, WINSTON & STRAWN LLP CLIENT BRIEFING: How THE TAX CODE
COMPLICATES AMENDING FINANCING, Feb. 19, 2009 (discussing these tax issues in
more detail).
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Hypothetical Facts
Total Syndicated Loan Facility:
Revolving Credit Facility:
Term Loan Facility:
Required Lenders:
Amount of Revolving Credit Loans and Term
Loans held by original lenders (all funded at par):
Amount of Term Loans held by hedge funds that
purchased Loans at 55% discount to par
Amount of Term Loans held by affiliate of
The borrower pursuant to a debt buyback
$100 million
$20 million
$80 million
51%
$40 million
$40 million
$20 million
Assume that the borrower's financial performance has
significantly deteriorated and it has breached its financial
covenants. The borrower has requested a waiver and amendment
to waive the defaults and loosen the financial covenants for a
period of eighteen months. The borrower believes that the
economy will significantly improve and the borrower's financial
performance will recover in that time. The administrative agent
projects that a liquidation of the borrower in bankruptcy would
result in a recovery by the lenders of approximately fifty percent of
their loans. Such a recovery would enable hedge fund lenders to
realize a small profit over the purchase price paid for their loans.
The original lenders would lose fifty percent of their original
investment. In light of the current situation, assume that the
original lenders are willing to agree to the borrower's request, but
the hedge fund lenders are not. The hedge fund lenders believe
that a restructuring in bankruptcy will eliminate the existing
shareholders and allow the hedge fund lenders to swap their debt
for full equity ownership of the borrower. The hedge fund lenders
are willing to risk an outright liquidation because they will recover
their full investment in a liquidation. At this point, there is a
stand-off between the original lenders and the hedge fund lenders
because each controls only forty percent of the vote. The original
lenders cannot approve the amendment and the hedge fund
lenders cannot force the administrative agent to exercise remedies
because the exercise of remedies must be requested by the
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required lenders. If the affiliated lender can vote, it controls the
vote and will agree to vote in favor of the borrower's proposed
amendment so that the amendment passes sixty percent to forty
percent. Lenders are unwilling to allow the borrower's affiliates to
sway votes in this manner. Had the affiliated lender been stripped
of its vote, the original lenders and the hedge fund lenders would
have had to work out a compromise supported by of a majority of
lenders. For example, a limited forbearance period of less than the
eighteen months requested by the borrower may have been
palatable to all lenders.
Finally, the Lenders should consider imposing strict
subordination terms on any repurchased debt held by an affiliate
of the borrower to prevent the holder from exercising the right to
receive payments from the borrower on a pari passu basis. Such
subordination terms may include:
" Absolute blockage of principal payments of
the repurchased term loan obligations;
" Absolute prohibition on the exercise of
remedies with respect to repurchased term
loan obligations;
" Express agreement by the holder of the
repurchased debt, as well as the borrower,
that the repurchased debt will be treated as a
separate class in the event of the borrower's
bankruptcy. Treatment of such debt in a
separate class is necessary to ensure that
such debt (1) does not participate in the
same voting class as the other lenders, and
(2) that such debt is not included with the
other debt under the syndicated loan
agreement debt when making an adequate
protection determination in bankruptcy.32
32. A detailed analysis of the enforceability of such subordination provisions in
bankruptcy is beyond the scope of this Article. However, please note that outright
pre-petition limitations on, or waivers of, a creditor's voting rights under the
Bankruptcy Code may not be enforceable in bankruptcy.
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Note that significant changes to the terms of the
repurchased debt (like the changes contemplated in this Part
V(B)) will likely result in the adverse tax consequences. More
specifically, such material changes may lead the Internal Revenue
Service to treat the debt as cancelled and re-issued under the new
terms which will force the borrower to recognize ordinary income
in an amount equal to the discount to par paid to purchase the
debt.33
In addition to the protective provisions discussed above,
the lenders considering an amendment to approve a debt buy-back
transaction need to evaluate several additional risk factors. First,
credit rating agencies may consider a below-par debt buy-back to
be tantamount to a default resulting in a downgrade of the
borrower's credit rating.34 Because many loan investment funds
have minimum ratings requirements for their investments, such a
ratings downgrade may cause non-compliance with such
requirements. To remedy such non-compliance, the applicable
fund may have to sell the loans of the downgraded borrower at
below market prices. Second, financial covenants should be
carefully examined to determine if any adjustments are needed as
a result of the debt buy-back, including (to the extent applicable)
changes in the leverage ratio, changes in interest expense coverage
ratio, changes in fixed charges (including fixed charges consisting
of permanent principal payments) included in the fixed charge
coverage ratio, and the effect of restricted payments. These effects
will vary, depending on whether the repurchased debt will be
cancelled or permitted to remain outstanding. Finally, any existing
mandatory prepayment provisions will need to be reviewed. In
particular, excess cash flow calculations should carefully be
evaluated in light of the debt repurchase and the expected use of
cash.
33. See also Batty & Kelly, supra note 31.
34. See Exchange Offers of Capital Markets Debt: New Guidance from Rating
Agencies, DLA PIPER, Apr. 27, 2009, http://www.dlapiper.com/ exchange-offers-of-
capital-markets-debt-new-guidance-from-rating-agencies/.
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
C. Market Responses to Debt Buy-Back Transactions Going
Forward
Much of the difficulty created by debt buy-back
transactions during 2008 and 2009 was a result of the fact that no
one ever expected syndicated loans to trade below par in the
secondary market. Recent trading at a significant discount has
encouraged participants in the syndicated loan market to eliminate
ambiguity in credit documentation with respect to debt buy-back
transactions. In Europe, the Loan Market Association (UK) has
proposed model debt buy-back provisions in the model documents
used by its members that permit debt buy-backs without any
lender approval as long as certain basic procedures are followed to
ensure that all lenders are given a fair opportunity to participate in
the debt buy-back transaction. This one-size-fits-all approach may
not be appropriate in all circumstances. While it is true that
borrower debt buy-backs are now common in the marketplace and
should be addressed in loan documents, it is also true that
historically only loans of distressed borrowers have traded at a
discount. Therefore, careful consideration should be given before
allowing distressed borrowers to have the unfettered right to
repurchase debt at a discount. The domestic loan market appears
to be taking a more conservation approach. More specifically,
syndicated loan arrangers in the United States are now drafting
their loan documents to make it clear that only the approval of the
required lenders is needed to approve a debt buy-back transaction.
VI. INNOVATIONS USED TO SOLVE THE REFINANCING CREDIT
CRUNCH
The lack of liquidity in the syndicated loan market during
most of 2008 and 2009 put significant pressure on borrowers facing
impending maturities of pre-crisis syndicated loans. In response to
the inability to refinance entire deals, borrowers and syndicated
loan arrangers sought new ways to keep as much of existing credit
facilities in place as possible. The solution to the liquidity problem
took the form of amendments to existing agreements whereby a
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subset of lenders agreed to extend the existing maturity date for a
set period of time (typically at least one year). These amendments
are known as "amend and extend" transactions in the domestic
syndicated loan market. In the European syndicated loan market
this type of extension transaction is called a "forward start
facility." Although conceptually similar to an "amend and extend"
transaction, there are some differences between the two
approaches to solving the refinancing crunch caused by a lack of
liquidity. Forward start facilities are discussed in more detail in
Part (VI)(B).
A. Amend and Extend Transactions
The extension of a syndicated loan's maturity date typically
does not require the approval of all of the lenders under the
applicable credit facility. Rather, maturity extensions need only
the approval of required lenders and each lender that is willing to
extend the maturity date of its pro rata share of the syndicated
loan. However, no lender's maturity date can be extended without
its consent. There are many benefits for the borrower of an
"amend and extend" transaction. A maturity date extension
allows the borrower to maintain a significant portion of its current
liquidity without having to negotiate an entirely new loan
agreement. Furthermore, the amendment fees needed to gain
lender approval for such an extension are typically far less than the
underwriting and upfront fees that would be paid for refinancing
an existing deal with a new bank group - even if a group of willing
lenders could be found.
The benefits to the lenders and syndicated loan arrangers
are far less certain. The primary benefit to the lenders is
economic. First, consenting lenders receive amendment fees for
agreeing to the amendment. Second, interest rate margins are
35. At a minimum these transactions needed lenders holding at least a majority
of the credit (outstanding loans and unfunded commitments) to agree to extend the
maturity date of the existing credit facility. Frequently, credit approval for an
amendment and extend transaction was conditioned on an even higher percentage of
lenders agreeing to extend so that the company did not face a liquidity crisis on the
existing maturity date.
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typically increased to current market levels. Similarly, an "amend
and extend" transaction provides the lenders an opportunity to
amend terms favorable to the borrower that are no longer broadly
accepted in the current syndicated loan market. Finally, such
transactions allow for syndicated loan arrangers to lock in as much
of the current bank group as possible in case market conditions
and liquidity problems worsen. These benefits, however, were
simply not enough for many lenders. Lenders who opposed
"amend and extend" transactions frequently argued that increased
pricing is an insufficient economic inducement to delay repayment
at par on the original maturity date. Lenders seeking a prompt
return of capital to shore up their own balance sheet are
particularly likely to object.
B. Forward Start Facilities
The forward start facility approach is prevalent in the
European credit market because extension of the maturity date
typically requires approval of all of the lenders rather than only
affected lenders as is the case in the domestic loan market. Similar
to an "amend and extend" transaction, a forward start facility
allows the borrower to maintain liquidity by obtaining current
commitments from existing lenders to refinance their existing
indebtedness on the existing maturity date. Forward start facilities
take the form of a new credit facility whose sole purpose is to
refinance the existing credit facility at maturity and the new
commitments typically cannot be drawn upon until the maturity
date of the existing credit facility. Frequently, large revolving
credit commitments are subject to scheduled commitment
reductions which function like the amortization of a term loan.
These scheduled reductions reduce lenders' total credit exposure
in a predictable manner as the maturity date approaches. If the
existing syndicated loan transaction includes such scheduled
commitment reductions, availability under the forward start
facility may be phased during a transition period to replace the
portion of an existing credit facility that is reduced pursuant to
such scheduled commitment reductions. Because the forward start
facility is used to refinance the existing credit facility, the
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participating lenders avoid increased credit exposure to the
borrower. The forward start facility structure avoids the need for
the existing credit facility's lenders to approve the forward start
facility. As is the case in an "amend and extend" transaction,
lenders who participate in a forward start facility receive fees that
are designed to supplement or "top up" the interest and fees under
the existing credit facility. This ensures that the aggregate
payment more closely reflects current market rates. The structure
of the forward start facility must be reviewed closely to confirm
that the borrower's obligations under the forward start facility
during the period from the effective date of such credit facility
through the date on which such credit facility is drawn do not
conflict with the terms of the existing credit facility. For example,
the payment sharing provisions of the existing credit agreement
may require that any interest or fees required to be paid to the
lenders that are party to both the forward start facility and the
existing syndicated loan agreement be shared ratably with the
other lenders that are only party to the existing credit agreement.
VII. CONCLUSION
There is no question that the credit crisis and global
recession of 2008 and 2009 restricted the syndicated loan market
for new debt issuances and caused a severe dislocation of the
secondary syndicated loan market. This widespread market
dislocation tested many customary concepts in syndicated loan
credit agreements. It also forced borrowers and lenders alike to
structure novel solutions to problems created by an illiquid
syndicated loan market. Fortunately, participants in the
syndicated loan market proved to be up to the task of adapting to
a deeper and longer credit crisis than could have been imagined in
the middle of 2007. Market innovations developed during this
period will carry through into the nascent recovery of the broader
syndicated loan market and will serve to help market participants
cushion the impact of future credit disruptions.

